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Subject: Hypergolic Propellant Related Spills and Fires 
Abstract: 
The attached report is a compilation of all credible, unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, 
and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, Titan Program, and a few other 
programs. Spill sites include the following government facilities: KSC, JSC, WSTF, VAFB, CCAFS, EAFB, 
Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. 
The root causes and consequences of the incidents contained in this document vary drastically; 
however, certain "themes" can be deduced and utilized for future hypergolic propellant handling. 
Some of those common "themes" are summarized below: 
• Improper configuration control and complacency can lead to being falsely comfortable with a 
system 
• Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur and/or 
hardware is damaged 
• Improper propulsion system and ground support system designs can destine a system for failure 
• Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger 
• Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in 
unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs 
• Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be 
detrimental and quickly lead to an undesirable incident 
• Improper local cleanliness or compatibility can result in fires or explosions 
The items listed above are only a short list of the issues that should be recognized prior to handling of 
hypergolic fluids or processing of vehicles containing hypergolic propellants. The summary of incidents 
in this report is intended to cover many more issues than those listed above that have been found 
during nearly the entire spectrum. of hypergolic propellant and/or vehicle processing.
Description of Driving Event: 
Hypergolic rocket propellants have proven to be a highly reliable asset in manned and unmanned space 
flight; however, their maintenance on the ground has proven to be relatively difficult. Do the 
operational risks from possibly catastrophic incidents, human errors, or hardware failures outweigh the 
usefulness of hypergols even though they have been used for the last 50 years of manned and 
unmanned spaceflight? One would have to say no, since hypergols are so widely used in the space 
industry currently and are being proposed to be used on many vehicles in the future. Therefore, ground 
operations on hypergol systems have become increasingly scrutinized for possible unknowns and 
rightfully so. This document is not an example of why we should not be using hypergolic propellants on 
spacecraft and launch vehicles, but rather what we can and should do to mitigate possible unforeseen 
ground operation and/or design problems. 
Some type of human error can be traced to nearly every incident discussed in this document as a root 
cause, whether it be an error in the design phase or an error prior to or during operational use of 
hardware containing hypergols. Humans are most definitely not perfect and even when the most 
knowledgeable personnel are intimately involved in the design phase (vehicle or GSE) or during an 
operation, mistakes can be made and items can be overlooked. One can deduce, however, that most 
incidents happen during some sort of operation, i.e. when the system is not static. Hypergols tend to be 
very stable in a static configuration (as long as the compatibility characteristics have been well 
addressed). 
Lesson(s) Learned: 
Some common lessons learned deduced from the various root causes are shown in the following list. If 
these items were properly addressed .prior to the incidents, prevention may have been possible (in 
hindsight) or the impact of the incident could have been reduced. 
. Improper configuration control and complacency can lead to being falsely comfortable with a 
system. 
o Vent systems are often neglected and treated as non-hazardous even though they can 
capture and contain hypergolic liquids (especially in low points). 
o Aging support hardware should be routinely inspected to reduce the risk of a failure 
during critical operations. 
• Communication breakdown can escalate an incident to a level where injuries occur or hardware 
is damaged. 
• Improper training of technicians, engineers, and safety personnel can put lives in danger. 
o Inadequate knowledge of electrostatic discharge while working fuel operations can lead 
to a fire or explosion. 
o Knowledge of transducer offsets is very important for system oversight. 
o Unknown incompatibilities (from lack of training or research) with propellants can cause 
surprising failures. 
o If an incident does occur, the system should immediately be put into a stable 
configuration; following this, the procedure should be stopped to assess the problem 
and its possible ramifications. 
o A heightened amount of situational awareness of technicians and engineers working 
operations can reduce the risk of an incident and decrease the possibility of injuries or 
damage if an incident does occur.
• Improper PPE, spill protection, and staging of fire extinguishing equipment can result in 
unnecessary injuries or hardware damage if an incident occurs. 
• Improper procedural oversight, development, and adherence to the procedure can be 
detrimental and quickly lead to an incident. 
o Improper emergency procedures can increase the risk of injuries or hardware damage. 
• Improper local cleanliness (for example: iron oxide or rust) can result in fires or explosions. 
• A thorough hypergol system evacuation should be completed (wherever a vacuum is tolerable 
by the system) prior to the removal or disconnection of any hypergolic propellant fittings. 
o A pulse purge has proven to be inadequate for the removal of residual propellants. 
Table 49-1 summarizes the fuel and oxidizer spills and fires presented in the report. Note that if the 
numbers in the table are totaled, they do not sum to the total amount of fuel and/or oxidizer spills 
summarized in this document. This is a result of some incidents having injuries and a fire, for example. A 
larger, more extensive list of the data shown in Table 49-1 can be seen in Appendix C: Detailed 
Assessment of Incidents (Refer to attached document). 
Table 49-1: Hypergol Spill and Fire Summary 
Oxidizer Incidents 
21 Total (Liquid and Vapor) 
7 Vapor Only 
2 Led to a Fire 
3 Led to an Explosion 
7 Led to Injuries (Minor to Death) 
11 Led to Hardware Damage
Fuel Incidents 
25 Total 
9 Led to a Fire 
2 Led to an Explosion 
7 Led to Injuries (Minor to Death) 
13 Led to Hardware Damage 
10 Oxidizer/Fuel No Hardware Damage or Injuries 
Root Causes: 
7 Procedure Adherence/Control (engineer or technician did not follow procedure or protocols were 
ignored) 
9 Improper Personnel Training (engineers or technicians were untrained or too inexperienced) 
14 Human Error (technician and/or engineers making a real-time error) 
19 Improper GSE/Vehicle Design (improper materials, unknown low points, incompatibilities etc.) 
11 Improper Configuration Management (system configuration and upkeep errors that led to an 
incident)
Incident Occurred During: 
17 During Commodity Movement 
15 During an R&R Procedure 
40 During a Nominal Hypergol Operation 
11 During Opened Hyper System 
3 In a Static Hyper System
Some lessons learned from the Apollo program related to hypergol loading equipment according to J. 
Tribe include: 
On-board vehicle instrumentation was limited to that required for flight evaluation; this dictated 
use of GSE instrumentation to monitor critical vehicle parameters during ground operations - a 
less than desirable configuration 
Operational visibility from the control room was minimal and there was extensive reliance on 
technicians (usually in SCAPE) to read gages correctly and position multiple manual valves. 
o This servicing and test disconnects on the command and service module (CSM) were 
challenging to manually position correctly 
o This inevitably led to a mis-configuration on Apollo 16 that resulted in a CM RCS tank 
ruptured bladder, roll back of the Saturn V stack and destack of the CSM and lunar 
module, lack of flight system instrumentation was a direct contributor to this event. 
As design matured, configuration changes increased complexity for ground operations greatly 
extended servicing timelines. 
o SM RCS changes from individual block 1 "quads" to block 2 to the propellant storage 
module installation are an example (8 tanks to 16 tanks to 25 tanks) 
o Each "quad" was a stand-alone system until the propellant storage module 
interconnected them. 
Multiple individual tanks on CSM required multiple access panels and disconnects 
o This multiplicity resulted in a complex ground servicing operation whit an extensive fluid 
distribution system, valve boxes, bleed units, ullage cylinders, purge panels and the 
need for weather-protected 360-degree access. 
o Servicing operations required a variety of loading methods - mostly sequential and 
time-consuming: 
• SPS fill used on-board gauging/totalizer to determine flight loads 
• RCS fill used a combination of evacuated tanks with load by weight and fill to 
overflow, removal of a specified ullage and manual PV determination to confirm 
flight loads. 
• Flight loads were accurate but the methods were time-consuming. 
o During the life of the program significant propellant spills (especially during Apollo 7 
preps) drove increased need for spill collection and containment. 
• The installation of improved scuppers at vehicle interfaces and facility 
precautions were complex and time-consuming. 
o Different fuels for different flight systems (A-SO and MMH) double the number of 
servicing units and fluid distribution systems 
o The Space Shuttle Program corrected many of these deficiencies with: 
• Remotely controlled operations from the LLC 
• Extensive use of software loading programs 
• Remotely operated disconnects and leak checks 
• Gang servicing valve disconnects for OMS and ARCS
Appendix B: Summary of Incidents (Found In Attached Document) 
The proceeding table is a summary of all the credible spills and fires included in this report along with 
their respective dates, locations, a short description, and primary lessons learned. 
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
Lea med 
Apollo 7 SPS N 204 9/1968 CCAFS LC-34 Inadequate purges resulted Spill protection is 
Spill in the collection of liquid necessary in a hypergolic 
N204 in a tubing low point, propellant transfer 
technician was removing a operation, do not 
panel when about 1-2 attempt to dilute liquid 
gallons of liquid N 204 spilled N 204 with water, and 
onto the vehicle and tubing low points should 
surrounding structure, some be eliminated from GSE 
vehicle damage, no reported in the design phase. 
injuries 
7/24/1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test During reentry the Performing tasks out of 
Apollo-Soyuz Project Apollo astronauts performed a few planned sequence can 
Astronaut N204 Command Module tasks out of sequence lead to unexpected 
Vapor Exposure Reentry leading to injection of N 204 results. 
(NO2) vapors into the crew 
module. ______________________ 
OV-101 APU 1
__________ 
6/28/1977
_________________ 
During second Approximately 5 gallons of Kapton and N 2 H4 are not 
Cavity Seal N 2 H4 captive-active test N 2 H4 spilled onto the side of compatible, some 
Spill flight of Enterprise the ship and in through the components of the APU 
vent doors when a shaft seal system were redesigned. 
failed, some flight hardware 
damage ______________________ 
__________________ 
Titan II Silo Large
__________ 
8/24/1978
_________________ 
McConnell AFB Silo The worst known N 204 spill Proper configuration 
Scale N 204 Spill 533-7 in U.S. history where control of GSE 
approximately 13,450 gallons components, in this case 
of liquid N 204 spilled into a the filter, is highly 
missile silo killing 2 and important in the 
injuring 25, caused by 0-ring handling of toxic 
seal lodging in AHC poppet, chemicals especially 
filter was missing from hypergols 
system to catch the 0-ring 
Titan II Explosion 9/18/1980 Little Rock AFB Silo A technician dropped a large All workers should wear 
Following A-SO Spill 374-7 socket 70 feet, it bounced a belt with lanyards to 
into the Titan II rocket attach tools, care should 
piercing the A-5O propellant be taken to ensure the 
tank, spilled about 11,140 exclusive use of 
gallons of fuel which later explosion proof 
ignited causing the N 204 hardware in a facility 
propellant tank to rupture that contains hypergolic 
causing a large explosion propellants, sending 
killing one and injuring 21, personnel into an 
the silo and rocket were unknown situation is 
damaged beyond repair. extremely dangerous.
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
Learned 
N 2 H4
 Spill Following Prior to STS-1 KSC OPF 1 N2H4 dissolved brass in a sight Unknown 
APU Hotfire glass spilling a couple gallons incompatibilities can 
of N 2 H4, no reports of injuries lead to surprising 
or damage spills during an 
operation or while 
in a static 
__________________ ______________ _________________ ____________________________ configuration 
KSC Incorrect Flight July 1981 KSC OPF 1 A 'A-inch AHC cap was placed An incorrect tag was 
Cap N204 Vapor onto a 'A-inch AHC causing the attached to the 
Release poppet to depress and the flight cap and the 
release N 204 (NO2 ) vapors, number etched on 
minor injuries, no hardware the cap was sanded 
damage off in attempt to 
remove corrosion 
MMH Exposure 7/14/1981 KSC Pad 39A Fuel A technician removed a Flexhose was not 
Following Flexhose Farm mislabeled flexhose resulting labeled as 
Removal at Pad in a MMH spill, minor injuries, hazardous and 
Farm no hardware damage procedure was not 
____________________________ properly scrutinized __________________ 
STS-2 OV-102 Right
______________ 
Fall 1981
_________________ 
KSC OPF 1 Small amount of MMH Ignition properties 
Pod MMH Fire dripped onto gold MLI blanket of MMH, 
causing ignition, no injuries, incompatibility of 
minor flight hardware damage MMH and Gold ________________ 
STS-2 OV-102 N 204
____________ 
9/22/1981
_______________ 
KSC Pad 39A 207- Iron nitrates caused a OD to Do not use QD5 as 
Spill Foot Level hang open, spilling shut off valves, 
approximately 15 to 20 inadequate spill 
gallons of N 2O4, no injuries, protection 
notable flight hardware 
damage ___________________ __________________ 
Pad 39A Fuel Farm
______________ 
6/29/1982
________________ 
KSC Pad 39A Fuel Valve removal led to MMH Removal of GN2 
MMH Spill and Fire Farm geyser hitting hot metal cable control pressure 
Following tray and igniting, no injuries, allowed normally 
Pneumatic Valve some GSE hardware damage open valves to open, 
R&R manual overrides 
____________________________ added later __________________ 
N204 Vapor Release
_______________ 
2/10/1983
_________________ 
KSC Pad 39A A GSE valve gasket blew out, The technicians and 
from Flange Gasket Oxidizer Farm venting N 204 (NO2 ) vapors to engineers 
atmosphere, there were no responded correctly 
injuries or hardware damage ___________________ __________________ 
FRCS Ferry Plug
_______________ 
4/18/1983
_________________ 
KSC OPF1 Cold outside temperatures Keep thruster 
Removal MMH Spill caused thruster MMH valves heaters on during all 
to leak and collect liquid in ferry flight and post-
the chambers, a technician landing operations 
was exposed to liquid (less to prevent valve 
than 'A cup) when a ferry plug leakage 
was removed
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
___________ Learned 
STS-9 OV-102 12/8/1983 EAFB Runway Stress corrosion cracking Injector stem is now 
APU 1 and 2 170 was present in the APU chromized and 
Explosion injector stem thus causing manufacturing 
an N 2 H4 leak and explosion, stresses 
no injuries, significant flight are minimized 
hardware damage ____________________ 
N204 Vapor 2/17/1984 KSC OPF2 A small amount of N 204 vapor Inadequate contractor 
Release from was released from an improperly oversight resulted in 
Loose Fitting torque fitting on the GSE oxidizer many incorrectly 
vent system, no injuries or torque fittings in the 
________________ ____________ ________________ hardware damage vent system 
CCAFS Tanker 5/16/1984 CCAFS Fuel MMH being drained from tanker Was either result of 
MMH Fire Storage Area 1 low point sump ignited, electrostatic discharge 
technicians received minor burns from something 
through SCAPE suits, minor GSE nearby or reaction of 
hardware damage MMH with local iron 
_______________________________ oxide (rust) ________________ 
Liquid Trap in
____________ 
5/24/1985
________________ 
KSC OPF1 Approximately 1 cup of MMH Proper procedure 
Purge Adapter spilled from a thruster purge controls could have 
Flexhose MMH adapter and onto the body flap, prevented this 
Spill minor injuries, minor flight 
____________ _______________ hardware damage ____________________ ________________ 
STS-61C OV-102 12/8/1985 KSC Pad 39A During removal of Leer- Romec QD anti-rotation 
SRB HPU MLP Surface QD, HC was spun off internal line devices were 
Loading N2 H4 leaking approximately 3 gallons implemented for use 
Spill of N 2 H4, no injuries or damage after RTF from 
____________ _______________ ______________________________ Challenger ________________ 
Inadvertent Dry 1/21/1986 KSC Pad 39A A technician erroneously Dry well retainers are 
Well Removal Fuel Farm removed a temperature now used on all 
MMH Spill transducer dry well from a 3-inch hypergolic dry wells 
GSE line causing a 12-
foot geyser of MMH, spilling 
100 gallons, minor injuries, 
minor GSE damage ________________ 
Relief Valve R&R
____________ 
7/29/1986
________________ 
KSC Pad 39A During a relief valve R&R, a
____________________ 
Engineering had 
Oxidizer Farm technician's SCAPE suit tore request to modify the 
N 204 Vapor delaying an operation where the hardware which was 
Release N204 storage tank was open to denied until after this 
atmosphere releasing N 204 (NO2 ) incident 
vapors, minor injuries, no 
hardware damage ____________________ 
OPF2 Trench 9/19/1986 KSC OPF2 N2H4 leaked from a GSE check Care needs to be 
N 2 H4 Spill and Trench valve fitting that did not have an taken when installing 
Fire 0-ring, dripped into trench and components in 
reacted with the residual debris hypergolic ground 
in the trench, igniting, no injuries support equipment, 
or damage also, cleanliness 
________________ ____________ ________________ _______________________________
should be scrutinized
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
Learned 
N204 and 6/23/1988 KSC Pad 39B During a sampling operation, An incompatibility 
Insulation Oxidizer Farm liquid N204 spilled onto some exists between N204 
Adhesive Small GSE line insulation adhesive and the adhesive used, 
Fire and ignited, no injuries, adhesive was not given 
minimal hardware damage enough time to 
properly cure ________________ 
STS-26R OV-103
______________ 
7/14/1988
______________ 
KSC Pad 398
____________________________ 
A scratched LRCS N204 The ingenuity of the 
N204 Tubing Leak propellant tank ullage vent launch team resulted in 
on Vehicle dynatube leaked vapors into only a short delay of 
vehicle at a rate of about 0.23 the successful launch of 
psi/hour, no injuries or Discovery 
hardware damage ________________ 
WSTF Fuel
______________ 
2/16/1990
_______________ 
WSTF Following the gravity draining
_____________________ 
Care needs to be taken 
Waste Flash Fire of a fuel aspirator into a in an environment that 
treatment tank, the residual contains high 
vapors ignited, no injuries, concentrations of fuel 
minor hardware vapors, they are highly 
damage susceptible to ignition ________________ 
Aspiration of
______________ 
3/26/1990
_______________ 
WSTF 15 401 A MMH aspiration flexhose Improper identification 
N204 into MMH was mistakenly connected to was the direct cause of 
Aspirator System the N2O4GSE manifold service this incident 
valve instead of the fuel 
manifold service valve, 
evidence of internal ignition, 
no injuries, minor hardware 
damage _____________________ ________________ 
HMF Screens
______________ 
12/7/1990
_______________ 
KSC HMF The hard-line hose from a It was not wise to 
Test Drum MMH M7-961 East SCAPE suit caught on a GSE design the system in 
Spill Test Cell manual valve handle and which a manual valve 
opened it, filling a 55 gallon handle protruded 
drum and subsequently spilling beyond the edge of the 
MMH out the drum's relief panel allowing items to 
valve, no injuries or damage become caught on it ________________ 
STS-42 OV-103
______________ 
2/12/1992
_______________ 
KSC OPF3 Similar to the incident Cold temperatures 
Ferry Plug 4/18/1983, less than a cup of during a SCA stopover 
Removal MMH MMH spill from thruster when resulted in RCS thruster 
Spill ferry plug was removed, no MMH valve to leak 
injuries or hardware damage since vehicle remained 
unpowered and the 
thruster heaters were 
off ____________ 
WSTF Incorrect
___________ 
11/4/1992
___________ 
WSTF OMS
______________________ 
A 1%-inch AHC cap was placed Proper training of 
Flight Cap N204 Ground Test onto a 34-inch AHC causing the technicians would have 
Exposure Article poppet to depress and spill decreased the 
liquid N204, minor injuries, no possibility of this 
hardware damage occurrence, similar to 
________________ ______________ ______________ ____________________________
event on 7/14/1981
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
Learned 
Thermochemical 4/21/1994 JSC TTA Approximately 16 gallons of The test team failed to 
Test Area N 204 liquid N 204 vaporized and notice anomalous 
Vapor Release exited a burner stack as a system performance and 
result of a leaky solenoid to take appropriate 
valve and inadequately action 
prepared test team, some 
minor injuries, no hardware 
damage ______________________ _________________ 
Titan IV A K-9
_____________ 
8/20/1994
_______________ 
CCAFS SLC-41 N204 liquid release of Schedule pressure can 
N 204 Spill approximately 350-400 result in leaving a system 
gallons following thermal in an undesirable 
expansion causing a line to configuration, proper 
rupture at a weld seam while utilization of relief valves 
static shortly after sunrise or ullage volumes should 
be mandatory 
STS-69 OV-105 12/9/1994 KSC OPF1 Decomposition reaction of Proper training needs to 
Left Pod MMH MMH in open thruster take place for all parties 
Fire flexhose caused ignition, no including the engineers 
injuries, minimal flight relating to emergency 
hardware damage response, hypergol fire 
identification, and 
communication 
STS-69 OV-105 5/4/1995 KSC OPF1 MMH was present in a A transducer offset was 
Right Pod MMH manifold that was having a not accounted for thus 
Fire dynatube disconnected, fire hiding an increase in the 
ignited possibly from an manifold pressure, 
electrostatic discharge or proper care was not 
decomposition reaction, no taken with respect to 
injuries, some flight hardware electrostatic discharge 
damage and fire extinguishing 
___________________________ equipment ________________ 
ORSU Open
_____________ 
3/1/1996
______________ 
WSTF 400-Area Liquid N 204 (approximately 90 Improper configuration 
Manual Valve N204 Storage gallons) poured from the vent management (manual 
N 204 Spill Area stack of the storage tank, no valve left slightly open) 
injuries or hardware damage existed in the 400 area 
___________________________ vent system 
OPF2 GSE MMH 2/17/1997 KSC OPF2 Approximately a pint of MMH An unrecognized low 
Spill spilled from a line when the point in the line allowed 
cap was removed, injuring the MMH liquid to 
three technicians, no collect 
hardware damage ______________________ 
HMF Sample 3/26/1997 KSC HMF M7- Approximately six ounces of MMH was not saturated 
Valve MMH Spill 1212 West Test MMH spilled from a sample with Helium which aids 
Cell valve port, MMH collected in the draining procedure 
flexhose low point, minor 
__________________ _____________ ________________ injuries, no hardware damage ________________________
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
Learned 
VAFB Titan IV 7/16/1997 VAFB SLC-4E Three of four Titan IV SRM Incompatable cleaning 
K- NC FCVs failed during agents caused a seal in the 
18 N 204 Spill system pressurization spilling FCV to rapidly expand 
about 244 gallons of liquid within the valve when the 
N 204 onto the vehicle SRM Bio T-200A cleaning agent 
aft skirts and ground, no reacted with liquid N204, 
injuries, minor flight proper scrutiny of material 
hardware damage compatibility was not 
completed on a newly 
design component 
______________ 
Pad 39B Slope
____________ 
11/6/1997
________________ 
KSC Pad 39B
__________________________ 
An undersized flange gasket Improper configuration 
N 204 Spill Slope and improper mounting management by improper 
brackets enabled a water drawing specifications, 
hammer effect to spill 25-50 drawings were not updated 
gallons of liquid N 204 on the to require the installation of 
pad B slope, an electrical fire the proper gaskets as the 
ensued when the liquid N204 pad A drawings were, cross-
contacted some nearby live over valve complex was 
cabling, no injuries, minor removed and replaced with 
GS.E hardware damage hard-line tubing ______________ 
STS-109 OV-
_____________ 
8/20/1999
________________ 
KSC OPF3 Liquid N 2 H4 ran down a New GSE was designed and 
102 flexhose from the high point installed to prevent this in 
APU N 2H4 Spill bleed QD and dripped on the the future 
orbiter elevon, no injuries, 
minimal flight hardware 
damage ________________________ 
_____________ 
WSTF
____________ 
8/7/2000
_______________ 
WSTF TS 401 During a decontamination Working steps out of 
Pathfinder procedure following an sequence and several days 
Axial Engine engine hotfire test, an axial later than required along 
Valve Failure engine valve and N 204 tubing with performing the 
failed (exploded) causing procedure with a 
extensive damage to temporary procedure rather 
surrounding hardware, no than a permanent 
injuries procedure were likely 
contributors to this event 
WSTF 8/12/2000 WSTF IS 401 Small amount of MMH This event was likely the 
Pathfinder dripped from a disconnected result of several issues 
Small MMH feedline and ignited, minimal compounding 
Fire hardware damage and no 
__________________ injuries _____________________________ ________________ 
WSTF Pressure
_______________ 
3/25/2003 WSTF TS 831 A pressure transducer The pressure transducer 
Transducer diaphragm failed causing manufacturer did not make 
Explosion N204 to leak into a volume the user aware that the 
filled with silicon oil leading transducer contained silicon 
to an explosion and a vapor oil 
release of approximately 3 
quarts, no injuries, some 
hardware damage _________________________
Incident Date Location Description Primary Lesson(s) 
Learned ________________ ________________ 
Titan IV N 204 Pump 8/12/2003 CCAFS A clogged filter in Improper 
Explosion LC-40 the recirculation maintenance of the 
loop of the pump pumps and possible 
resulted in an design flaws led to 
increase in N 204 the explosion 
(NO2 ) vapors and a 
decrease in the 
lubrication of the 
stator allowing N204 
to leak into the 
copper windings and 
exploding, no 
injuries, major GSE 
hardware damage ___________________ 
HMF RPO1 N 204
___________________ 
6/5/2004
___________________ 
KSC HMF M7-961 A flight cap was
__________________ 
The most probable 
Spill East Test Cell removed while, causes include 
unknowingly, the improper and/or 
AHC poppet was inadequate bleed 
stuck slightly in the procedures, 
open state leaking degradation of 
roughly 1.4 gallons process and/or 
of N 204, minor system knowledge 
injuries and no over time, or nitrate 
hardware damage buildup on the flight 
__________________ cap bleed port __________________ 
WSTF N 2H4 Spill
__________________ 
9/30/2005
__________________ 
WSTF IC 844B A manual valve The valve soft seals 
Following Manual bonnet (handle) failed thus leaking 
Valve Failure failed in a IAPU GSE liquid N 2 H4 into an 
setup spilling internal area where 
approximately 74 an aluminum bronze 
gallons of liquid fitting was located, 
N2 H4, no injuries, over time the fitting 
some GSE hardware corroded and later 
damage failed spilling the 
_________________
N2H4 
_________________ 
STS-121 FRC3
_________________ 
1/9/2006
_________________ 
KSC HMF M7-1212 Approximately 2.9 Closer scrutiny of 
N 204 Spill West Test Cell gallons of N 204 procedures and spill 
spilled following protection could 
removal of AHC have reduced the 
MD122 poppet, no likelihood of this 
injuries, some flight spill 
hardware damage ___________________
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